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
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EFFECTS ON THE SUPERIOR/SUBORDINATE
RELATIONSHIPS, A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR
TO JUNIOR OFFICER DISSATISFACTION

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10 By
Major John R. Malpass
Infantry

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↓ THIS STUDY ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE IF THE LENGTH OF COMMAND TOUR FOR BATTALION COMMANDERS IS A FACTOR IN JUNIOR OFFICER DISSATISFACTION. THE INVESTIGATION IS FOCUSED ON AN ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE SUPERIOR/SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIPS OF BATTALION COMMANDERS AND JUNIOR OFFICERS.

INVESTIGATION REVEALS THAT LENGTH OF COMMAND TOUR AFFECTS THE LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR OF THE BATTALION COMMANDER AND IS ONE OF THE FACTORS CAUSING JUNIOR OFFICER TURNOVER. FURTHER EXAMINATION REVEALS THAT A COMMAND TOUR LENGTH OF THREE YEARS WOULD: FORCE COMMAND BEHAVIOR TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE LONG TERM GOALS OF THE ARMY, RATHER THAN THE SHORT TERM GOALS OF THE INDIVIDUAL COMMANDER; AND MAY ENHANCE OPMS. ↑

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USACGSC RESEARCH PAPER

RAPID ROTATION OF THE COMMANDER: EFFECTS ON THE
SUPERIOR/SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIPS, A CONTRIBUTING
FACTOR TO JUNIOR OFFICER DISSATISFACTION

A MONOGRAPH

BY

Major John R. Malpass
Infantry

US Army Command & General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1 June 1978

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TITLE: Rapid Rotation of the Commander: Effects on the Superior/
Subordinate Relationships, A Contributing Factor to Junior
Officer Dissatisfaction

PREFACE

One of the most satisfying experiences in serving in a troop unit is watching the new lieutenants, fresh from all their theoretical training on leadership, getting their feet on the ground and establishing rapport with their troops. They discover that the theories work, and they set out to train the best platoons in the Army. Their enthusiasm and initiative are infectious.

One of the saddest experiences in serving in a troop unit is watching those same lieutenants put in paperwork for a transfer or resignation. They are defeated and dissatisfied; they agree that the effort they are putting forth is just not worth it, in terms of satisfaction of completing the job.

This phenomenon has been apparent for several years, but why has it happened? With junior officers who were so clearly dissatisfied with their jobs, what was to be done? A report by the Junior Officers Council highlighted the problems, and an article by Major Henry G. Gole, entitled, "Officers Lack Time To Do Their Jobs," which appeared in the 4 April 1977 edition of the Army Times, helped put the problems in clear perspective.

While the problem was more complex in its interrelationships than one might anticipate, the central causes of the problem ultimately clustered around leadership and managerial skills which mid-level leaders had not fully developed, or at least were not practicing. A less obvious, possibly central, but indirect cause of junior officer dissatisfaction was the limited length of time battalion commanders occupied their command billets, the very thing which Gole had written about in the Army Times.

This monograph is not a condemnation of our leaders, or our personnel management system. Rather, it is an investigation of leadership behavior, especially the overlapping and complex interrelationships that relate the superior to his subordinates. Hopefully it will spark some reassessment of existant leader roles, and generate a better understanding of human behavior, pursuant to the obtainable outcome: increased junior officer retention.

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"Most people are not listening; of those listening, most don't understand; of those understanding, only some agree; of those agreeing, only a few remember; of those remembering, only a few will be in a position to influence others; and of these, some will change their minds and timidly remain silent."

Anonymous

INTRODUCTION

According to a 1975 study by Dale W. Schofield, "The majority of junior officers commissioned in the United States Army leave active duty at completion of their initial service obligation." (13,5) There is no doubt that lack of job satisfaction plays a major role in the decisions of those departing officers. Any organization that cannot retain its young managers lacks a viable personnel management system. The time and money spent on recruitment, training, and development, particularly in times of severe monetary constraints, are unjustified and unwarranted. This monograph investigates one of the possible contributing factors to junior officer dissatisfaction: the rapid rotation of the commander.

Volumes of studies on job satisfaction have been completed on large corporations, small businesses, and the armed services. To date, the results of the many surveys and investigations have apparently fallen on deaf ears - at least as far as the Army is concerned.

This monograph does not represent a new approach to the subject of personnel management or behavioral science, nor does it offer any but the most tentative kinds of new recommendations for solving problems of job satisfaction. It is, alternatively, a background of information from selective studies on behavioral science that might assist future commanders, particularly as they face the problem of junior officer dissatisfaction and retention.

Many of our junior officers view the Army merely as a job, a means to gain personal experience to be used in another career at a later date. Nevertheless, the Army should not be comfortable with explanations that dismiss mass resignations as a logical consequence of the values, expectations, and career intentions of young officers embarking on

military careers to which they are not committed. Their motivations for entering the service are a substantive question, but beyond the scope of this monograph.

On the subject of an Army career, a former commander once asserted that it was the Army's responsibility to offer the challenge, and that, once that challenge was gone, it was best for all concerned to try a new line of work. His thesis is clearly still relevant. The Army has the potential of being one of the most challenging jobs available, yet many fine young officers leave the service every year--officers who might have contributed greatly and made the Army better for all. Why, then, does the Army lose more than its fair share of good men and women?

Frederick Herzberg, one of the foremost authorities on motivation theory, has stated, "Knowledge about the nature of man, his motives and needs could be invaluable to organizations and individuals." (7, 54) The Army's own manual on leadership also states that:

Studying human behavior will help the leader acquire the knowledge required to understand himself and his men, to learn why men act and react in certain ways, to identify various types of behavior, and to learn how to influence the behavior of subordinates so that their personal goals complement or reinforce the unit's goals. (4,5-1)

In the age of computer technology and mathematical models, it is sometimes difficult to remember the basics; i.e., that management must adjust to its people, not vice versa. (7,69) To do so, the leader/manager must have a basic background in the behavioral sciences to understand why the human animal acts the way he does. The study of the nature of man does not lend itself to simple, all-encompassing, descriptive terms; rather, it depends primarily on experience.

A background in behavioral science would include a summary of Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of basic needs. From the lowest to the highest, they are:

1. Physiological Needs; i.e., food, water, shelter, and rest.
2. Safety Needs; i.e., freedom from worry, and job security.
3. Social Needs; i.e., belonging to a group, association, being accepted by fellow workers, giving and receiving friendship and love,
4. Ego Needs; i.e., self-esteem, self-confidence, independence, achievement, competence, and knowledge; and those needs relating to one's reputation, status, recognition, appreciation, and the deserved respect of one's followers.
5. Self-Fulfillment or self-actualization needs; i.e., realizing one's potentialities, continued self-development, and creativity. (3,217-9)

It must be understood that, "Man is a wanting animal - as soon as one of his needs is satisfied, another appears in its place. This process is unending. It continues from birth to death. A satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior!" (3,217) While the Army does relatively well in satisfying the first two "lower order" needs, I contend that the Army seldom satisfies ego needs, and rarely satisfies self-actualization needs. Therein lies the problem. The modern Army, with its heavy dependence on computers, quantifiers, and "technocrats," is performing at a subpar level. The efflux of junior officers is only symptomatic. Young men and women join the officer corps knowing there will be sacrifices and hardships; they join knowing the challenge is there and that the opportunity to fulfill higher order needs will offset

any imbalance. Sudler concluded that, "The best method of retaining junior Army officers is to increase the factors that tend to motivate individuals; i.e., achievement, recognition, responsibility, work itself, advancement, growth and patriotism." (13,3) Yet junior officers depart disappointed, disgruntled, and resentful. It is a sad commentary that this deficiency still persists, and furthermore, is allowed to endure, particularly when there are means to cure it. A discussion of the higher order needs follows.

JOB SATISFACTION

Job satisfaction may be defined as the "affective response of the worker to his job. It is viewed as a consequence of the workers experience on the job in relation to his own values, that is, to what he wants or expects from it. Satisfaction can be viewed as similar in meaning to pleasure." (3,272) Fundamental to the understanding of job satisfaction are Fredrick Herzberg's motivator and hygiene factors. When he analyzed the data from his study, Herzberg concluded that:

...man has two different categories of needs which are essentially independent of each other and affect behavior in different ways. He found that when people felt dissatisfied with their jobs, they were concerned about the environment in which they were working. On the other hand, when people felt good about their jobs, this had to do with the work itself. Herzberg called the first category of needs hygiene factors because they describe man's environment and serve the primary function of preventing job dissatisfaction. He called the second category of needs motivators since they seemed to be effective in motivating people to superior performance. (7,54)

The hygiene factors which would preclude job dissatisfaction include, "company policy and administration, supervision, interpersonal relationships, working conditions, salary, status, and security." (3,230)

On the other hand, the "satisfiers," or motivating factors, giving job satisfaction are, "achievement, recognition for achievement, the work itself, responsibility, and growth or advancement." (3,230) Notice the striking similarity to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, then consider a discussion of job-satisfaction at a junior officers' council meeting.

The similarities are there too.

In view of the numbers of Jr Officers getting out of the service, and the fact that the Army has not met its recruiting goals, nationally, for several months, it becomes obvious that the Army is not competing favorably with civilian enterprises in the job market. In the opinion of the Junior Officer Council, there are many reasons for this, some of them being lack of job satisfaction, erosion of benefits, i.e., commissary, retirement, GI bill, etc., superficial attention to the personal needs of the individual, a lot of busywork, babysitting such as SDO at Post, Bde, Bn & Company and cover your rear reports, oversupervision and crisis management by superiors, a lack of time available for officers to take advantage of graduate education programs and benefits, existence of a surplus of additional duties all loaded on the Jr Officer with many being meaningless, the lack of a valid evaluation system, a promotion system that promotes mediocrity and provides no incentive, command pressure for participation in mandatory officer associations, officer clubs, and social functions, a lack of effective response from many post services, e.d., hospital, DFAE, and Finance, and probably most important is a lack of, what Jr Officers believe, is proper perspective, both institutional and individual, by many senior officers and senior NCO's and some post agencies. (9,1)

LTC Thomas H. Spence, in his Army War College monograph, did an excellent study on Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory as it pertains to junior officers. It should be required reading for all commanders. He suggests that all of Herzberg's factors are interrelated.

For instance, responsibility may itself add interest to the work assigned, which may lead to achievement and recognition for the achievement and hopefully, more responsibility as the cycle continues. While it is not always necessary that each factor be present, with each absence, the other factors must assume a greater burden if in the final analysis job satisfaction is to exist." (11,10)

POSSIBLE CAUSE-EFFECT CYCLE


Unfortunately, the junior officer is faced with an entirely different cycle, as shown in figure 1. "Rapid rotation" at the center of the "cause-effect cycle" is not only the cause of the detrimental effects around its circumference, but also a source of on-the-job dissatisfaction for the junior officer. In this sense, the rapid rotation of commanders also causes the rapid turnover of junior officers.

Consider the plight of the battalion commander, who has a job in which leadership and managerial ability are critical. In 18 months, or, at most, 2 years (depending on locations), he must prove his ability to command. He knows he must look good in everything he does to be successful. He knows - in spite of what is said - that mistakes will not be tolerated by his superiors. Major Henry G. Gole, in his article, "Officers Lack Time to do Their Jobs," summarized this underlying problem:

The implications of short command tenure are clear to those familiar with the US Army's command policy. Our system does not tolerate a single misstep even by carefully selected battalion and brigade commanders. The 18-month command period has at least two serious deficiencies: the abuse of soldiers and the can-do syndrome. It takes a rare human being to resist the temptation to use people as though they are spare parts for the Green Machine. During his command time, the battalion or brigade commander is under pressure to accept all missions and to do all of them in an "outstanding" manner - even if the demands upon him are sometimes unreasonable. Because commanders are human, and because command is a much sought-after opportunity that leads to reward by the system, the result of this process is too often the satisfaction of personal ambition at the expense of soldiers (whom the commander will soon be leaving in any event). Troops and commanders go from one crisis to the next without pause. However, the commander moves on to bigger and better things after 18 months, while the soldier braces himself for another mad cycle of frenetic activity under a new boss. (6,15)

Figure 1

POSSIBLE CAUSE-EFFECT CYCLE



(12, figure III-1)

Gole suggests, and I agree, that the Army should use the Bundeswehr command system, which retains an officer in command for at least 2 years or longer (German officers commanding battalion serve up to 4 years). (6,15) A compromise of 36 months would be a start in the right direction.

Of course, there are drawbacks to an extended command period. The obvious one is that not as many O-5's and O-6's would be selected for command. Some would argue that the Army is not selecting its best officers anyway. In many instances the Army would be hard pressed to find good battalion and brigade commanders under the proposed constraint if the "reduced number" to be selected came from the present command selection lists--if General Roger's "human oriented" criterion were used. However, this selection problem is a subject for other studies.

Understand that the length of command tour is not the prime cause of junior officer dissatisfaction, but it is a supporting variable. The Army has the tendency to recruit the authoritarian type personality, then encourages this type of behavior. Obviously the personality is independent of tour length, and one does not have difficulty remembering the many excellent commanders who did a fine job in 18 months. . . . Authoritarian-type personalities are, perhaps, the most likely to seek command and all the power that command provides. For this type of personality, reeducation is paramount. A discussion of personality types follows.

THEORY X VERSUS THEORY Y

Why then is an 18-month tour not long enough? Your answer could very well depend on your theory of leadership. Do you believe in task-centered or person-centered leadership? Autocratic versus Democratic? Structure versus Consideration? Theory X or Theory Y?

"The orthodox...doctrine, which has enjoyed unquestioned preeminence until relatively recent times, has held that the leader must be the brain of the group. He must plan, direct, coordinate, supervise, and evaluate work done by members of his group." (3,349) This "scientific management" approach is the task-centered, autocratic, structured, Theory X. The underlying assumptions for Theory X, according to Douglas McGregor, the author, are:

The average human being has an inherent dislike of work, and will avoid it if he can; therefore, most people must be coerced, controlled, and directed to put out adequate effort to achieve objectives; and the average human being prefers to be directed, avoids responsibility, has little ambition, and wants security above all else." (13,11-I-6)

The other approach, Theory Y, is humanistic-oriented. It is nondirective, or group centered in nature, and proposes that the leader's main function lies in enabling his subordinates to become self-directing, developing an atmosphere which will permit group members to contribute most creatively and constructively to the task. (3,349)

Which set of assumptions most closely fits what we know about human behavior? Or, in another context, which boss would you rather work for, one who believes Theory X or Theory Y? These theories are sets "of assumptions about human nature which a given person holds, consciously or unconsciously inside his own head." (17,81) In McGregor's own words,

Theory X and Theory Y are not managerial strategies: They are underlying beliefs about the nature of man that influence managers to adopt one strategy rather than another. In fact, depending upon other characteristics of the manager's view of reality and upon the particular situation in which he finds himself, a manager who holds the beliefs that I called Theory X could adopt a considerable array of strategies, some of which would be typically called "hard," and some which would be called "soft." The same is true with respect to Theory Y. (17,81)

How does managerial style differ with these different theories?

According to Dr. Arthur B. Sweeney,

The superordinate who selects a confrontive role corresponds to the authoritarian as described in the literature by...McGregor's Theory X.

The authoritarian role can be described in terms of his sociometric behaviors. He tends to reject many but select few. Paradoxically, however, he is often selected by many and rejected by few because superficially he is given credibility for his rejecting behavior. These trends may be of short duration or occur only in highly formal structures but they have been represented enough to be recognized and recorded. The authoritarian is also a problem seeker rather than a solution seeker. He obtains greater satisfaction from discovering incompetence than from developing systems of operation and training that reduce incompetence. Very often he will discount solutions brought to him by his subordinates because of his psychological need for maintaining the situations in which problems will arise and in which his hostility can be directed toward scapegoats. "Crisis management" very often seems to be preferred by the authoritarian. (14,4-5)

Dr Sweeney continues with the opposite managerial style:

The equalitarian does not perceive his primary job as manipulating or influencing the behavior or motivation structure of his subordinates. He assumes that the organizational and individual self-selection process have continued logically and that he is working with a group of competent and motivated individuals. He recognizes that productive experiences can overcome limitations anchored in individual differences. He expects realistic experiences to build individual competencies where superior mediated positive and negative reinforcements may only build insecurity. The equalitarian is objectively cool in dealing with people and restrains himself from utilizing a great deal of

manipulative behavior. He has few needs in maintaining social distance between himself and subordinates and yet does not give away his power except where his subordinate needs it to complete his obligations. The focus of the objective leader is toward the completion of the organizational goals, which he already assumes to be mutually beneficial both to his subordinates and himself. Having made the Theory Y assumptions, he regards manipulation to be unnecessary. (14,7-8)

Research has indicated that both managerial styles get the job done with comparable results. (5,13) Chaplain (LTC) William R. Gentry reports on an investigation done by COL Harris and Professor Nicholson in which the authoritarian style achieved impressive short-term results, particularly when the leader was technically competent. There was, "evidence that, for a period of at least one year, supervision which increases the direct pressure for productivity can achieve significant increases in production." (5,13) However, the investigators also concluded that the leaders holding Theory Y assumptions will unquestionably achieve better long-term results, even though the leaders with Theory X assumptions may make the most impressive short-term impact. (5,13) An 18-month command is "short-term;" a 3-year command is "long-term." Given the same objective, that is, a successful command, which approach would an ambitious leader use? The equations are: Theory X = 18-month tour; Theory Y = 3-year tour. To do otherwise in a given amount of time would be self-defeating. Gentry arrives at the same conclusion:

...longer tours of duty in the same position would allow more time to develop successful participatory and persuasive managerial skills. This would also require a manager to face up to his failures rather than to leave them for his successor. Three or more years in the same position would require the manager to deal with longer term issues and problems, and, thus,

to deal with the repercussions of his managerial style. This would, of course, favor the manager who could share with his subordinates in decisionmaking, and give them the responsibility and freedom to develop their own unique contributions to the unit. (5,16)

Consider the other beneficial side-effects of longer tours in commands. For instance, because there would be fewer command slots available, OPMS would be forced to be more discriminating in their command selections. As we shall see later, there are few colonels who are both good managers and good leaders. Both traits are essential for battalion command. Those officers who are naturally good at staff work would be happy with their secondary OPMS specialty, knowing that if they did well, they would be promoted as assuredly as if they had been selected for command. And, more significantly, those who thought they wanted to command, but not for 3 years, would leave openings for those few qualified officers who would grasp the opportunity to lead troops for as long as they could.

Gentry's study surfaced some fascinating data. In a survey of 75 general officers (comparable to the executive-level managers in civilian industry), he found that 83 percent did not measure up to Dr. J. Sterling Livingston's essential traits needed for success as an executive level manager, nor did they meet the standards as defined in FM 22-100, Military Leadership. (5,13) Livingston's prerequisites for successful management are: "(1) Need for power; (2) Need to manage; and (3) the capacity for empathy." (5,34) FM 22-100 states in its preface, "Leadership that is based on position and authority and is lacking in empathy will, in the long run prove ineffective." (4, 1 and 5,13)

The key word is EMPATHY, the understanding of how others feel. How then is it possible that such a large percentage of military "executives" could be lacking in empathy - a trait deemed essential for success in both management and leadership? Perhaps those officers who managed to survive under the whirlwind leadership of an empathy-lacking commander saw the rewards of the system, and decided that success meant using Theory X assumptions. Remember, Theory X works for the short-term.

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

Gentry oversimplified the problem by lumping managers and leaders together. Intuitively, one can see that although big business and the Army have many similarities in executive-level management, there are also quite a few differences. In an Army magazine article, LTC Andrew P. O'Meara, Jr., cites the differences between leaders and managers:

The art of leadership consists in the persuasive and skillful use of professional criteria and societal goals or norms in order to influence, direct and motivate men. The art of management consists in the skillful use of resources in order to protect an investment or maximize profits. (10,13)

These differences, according to O'Meara, "create a situation in which it is rare for any one person to excel both as manager and leader, and lays the groundwork for the management-leader (M/L) conflict." (10,14)

The two skills overlap somewhat, particularly in the battalion command position. But, essentially, the commander is first the leader, while the staff manages. The tragedy is that because only a few highly gifted people possess the capacity for both, and, when a "successful" manager - who all too often has not spent much time with troops - becomes a commander, as a reward for his staff prowess, a major calamity ensues. In discovering his inherent inability to influence his command, he turns to the job he knows best: managing the staff, and, what is worse, managing his subordinate commanders. In effect, he fails to lead. (10,14) General Lucius D. Clay was quoted in Air Force magazine,

A myth has been conceived and is growing that management and command are synonymous. They are not. Devotees of the myth see management as a replacement for command. There is

great danger in that concept. Management has a proper place in the operation of a military service, but management must be recognized for what it is, a system of bookkeeping that is primarily associated with statistics. Statistics are static. They can do nothing except provide a means of measuring. Command is the relationship between people. People do things. (16,28)

Recall, if you will, the "Possible-Cause Effect Cycle." Let us attempt to determine the extent of the predicament the commander is in, and the implications on job satisfaction.

CAUSE AND EFFECT

Starting from the center of the circle in fig. 1, one must understand that the battalion commander must have had a superior record and the proper mix of assignments to get to the position in the first place. He may or may not be a below-the-zone selectee, but he knows for sure he has the opportunity of a lifetime: an exceptional performance could very well mean an early promotion. He knows he is going to be "in the barrel" for 18-months of keen competition in the midst of his peers. He knows he cannot afford to make any mistakes, for in doing so, he will not have the opportunity to correct them - even though 18 months at the speed of light covers a lot of miles. There is, in essence, no time for trial and error, and there will always be someone "waiting in the wings" if he does not do well. Centralized control seeps in about the time the commander learns his way around post. All reports, letters to higher headquarters, plans for future operations, etc., must be sent to his office for approval. The index cards with the personnel strength, the names of those who are overweight, the bumper numbers of the deadlined vehicles, the AWOLS, the expeditious discharge status, etc., etc., become thicker and thicker in the breast pocket. Meanwhile, the commander, who is working up to 20 hours a day, sees his in-basket become a hold-basket. Distribution becomes bottlenecked, and needed discussions never take place. The Machine grinds more slowly. In an attempt to check everything for spelling errors, a suspense is missed....

Oversupervision hurts the chain-of-command. Company commanders, seeking meaningful work and wary of their subordinates' mistakes,

do the platoon leaders' jobs, the lieutenants do the sergeants' jobs, the sergeants do the jobs of the enlisted men. The enlisted, with nothing left to do (except cut grass, repair bleachers, and police training areas), patrol the snack bar and otherwise get themselves into trouble with the sergeant major. Massive oversupervision, and its fallout, "crisis-management," are a deep concern of today's junior officer, and may very well spell trouble in future conflicts. The complexity of the modern battlefield and the number of independent decisions to be made by junior officers require, in peacetime, less supervision, autonomy to make the necessary decision, and authority to execute. To do otherwise could prove fatal.

By giving the junior officer the autonomy he desires, letting him establish his own priorities (within guidelines), and freeing him from the obligation of reporting every type of status conceivable, the Army would eliminate its chief dissatisfier.

Several management studies have shown what happens when oversupervision is eliminated. In an article by Edwin A. Fleishman and Edwin F. Harris, foremen with high "Structure" values had high grievance and turnover rates; those with low "Consideration" values also had high grievance and turnover rates. These elements are comparable to McGregor's Theory X and Y assumptions. According to **Fleishman.**

Consideration includes behavior indicating mutual trust, respect, and a certain warmth and rapport between the supervisor and his group. This does not mean that this dimension reflects a superficial "pat-on-the-back, first name calling" kind of human relations behavior. This dimension appears to emphasize a deeper concern for group members' needs and

includes such behavior as allowing subordinates more participation in decisionmaking and encouraging more two-way communication.

Structure includes behavior in which the supervisor organizes and defines group activities and his relation to the group. Thus, he defines the role he expects each member to assume, assigns tasks, plans ahead, establishes ways of getting things done, and pushes for production. This dimension seems to emphasize overt attempts to achieve organizational goals. (3,272)

Fleishman showed that there is an application in the interaction between "Consideration" and "Structure" that could pertain to the Army. Structure is the dominant factor, but regardless of the degree of structure, if the supervisor had high Consideration, grievances and turnover were low. (3,305)

Grievances and turnover were lowest for groups with foreman showing medium to high consideration together with low structure. However, one of the most important results is the finding that high Consideration foreman could increase Structure with very little increase in grievances and no increase in turnover. High consideration foremen had relatively low grievances and turnover, regardless of the amount of structuring engaged in. (3,306)

The point is, the Army can be structured to the required degree and still have low turnover, if Consideration is high. In another study, Rensis Likert states that, "in widely different industries...supervisors who are getting the best production, the best motivation, and the highest levels of worker satisfaction are employee-centered appreciably more often than production centered." (3,309)

Figure 1 (page 8) indicated that detailed status reporting, combined with the lack of time available to establish mutual trust and confidence, gives the commander an overwhelming reliance on statistics instead of on "feel." Consider the type of statistics the commander

is required to keep. A "good" statistic is, in effect, the absence of something bad. We rarely keep track of our good points, such as 97 percent of the Anti-tank platoon fired expert on the TOW trainer; instead, we add up the number of accidents, AWOLs, etc. "Statistical indicators are legitimate management tools and should not be disregarded summarily. It is their misuse, not their existence, to which there is a loud objection." (15,L1-A5-2-76) How many command OER's were written on statistical indicators, rather than on the ability to command? What is more important: Form or Substance? Again, it seems that we are only interested in short-term results, measureable trivia and whatever makes the commander (and his commander) look good. There is no reward for long-term, non-quantifiable issues - like good training. For example, it is frustrating to the junior officer to see his unit giggered on the AGI inspection because he has misplaced a training bulletin. The fact that his outfit used that bulletin to conduct the suggested training makes no difference to the inspector. On the other hand, the unit which kept all its bulletins in plastic folders, and never used them after filing comes out looking good. The befuddled junior officer asks, "Which is more important?"

These are the types of statistics that cause the commander to lose the "feel" of what is actually happening - unless he could be around long enough to know his troops and establish mutual trust and confidence. Then he would not have to prepare for the AGI for 6 weeks at the expense of training!

In Confessions of a Corporate Headhunter, Allan Cox speaks about stability. He says,

In the traditional bureaucratic structure the successful executive has been admired for virtues such as stability, meaning a willingness to carry out orders without resorting to whimsey or arrogance, such as imagination or innovative criticism. Stability usually translates into a higher virtue by dint of long service, when it is escalated to loyalty. In military systems as well as traditional corporate ones, individuals serve the system, and the system is the telos, not the man. (2,64-5)

The way to obscure the system of mutual trust and confidence--without having to worry about the trial time needed to establish it--is to tell your boss exactly what he wants to hear: give him those "good" statistics. Tell him you are in the process of discharging those potential AWOL's, so that your AWOL rate is bound to go down... Don't bother to bore him with your idea to eradicate the cause of the AWOL's at the expense of one of his policies; just tell him you are taking care of the symptoms, otherwise, you might endanger your hierarchical position. Ride it out - no waves - get along with your boss - ensure the "perfumed stagnation of the corporate intelligence while winning praise [on your administrative ability]...and gastritis from frustration." (2,65-6)

IMPEDIMENTS TO PERFORMANCE

Although there is a positive correlation between job satisfaction and performance, the two do not always merit a connection. (3,272) A person could be happy in his job with zero productivity, because no one is forcing him to produce. This is rarely the case in an infantry battalion; zero productivity is not the normal goal of the junior officer. On the contrary, the junior officer is most often swamped with tasks requiring the utmost in productivity. A total of 81 additional duties were recently surveyed by a division G1. The breakdown of duty appointments was as follows: Brigade 20; battalion 33; company 28. (9,3) This micromanagement of trivia is an example of "Horizontal Job Loading." Needless to say, these duties take the lieutenant away from his principal job - the one that he joined the Army to do - the one that would give him satisfaction: training his platoon for combat. You do not give responsibility by expanding the number of meaningless duties, "horizontal loading merely enlarges the meaninglessness of the job." (11,18)

The Army approach must shift from horizontal loading to vertical loading. Vertical job loading is giving more responsibility, recognition, and growth to an individual within his area of work. It means permitting the initiator of an action to follow it through to completion, including accepting the responsibility for errors. (11,18)

If the officer makes a mistake, or inadequately completes any of his duties, it is thought to be a reflection upon his senior. In failing to affix responsibility at the lowest level, the subordinate is not only relieved of that responsibility, but also

of achievement, recognition for achievement, and identification of that work as his own. Meanwhile, the

superior is frequently so bogged down in the mechanics of jobs under his command, that he has little time to plan, organize, and furnish the high level guidance needed by young officers and the organization." (5,17)

How often have we received guidance in the form of those magnificent words of wisdom, "Don't screw it up!"?

Spence gives an excellent example of how to give more meaningful responsibility. He says,

Why couldn't the Army adopt an 'Authority delegated to:' command line? Then the initiator, not an adjutant, could sign his own work, receive public credit and acceptance for his work and thus receive added recognition for his efforts. This small change would not relieve the commander of his legal responsibility, but it would say, 'I have sufficient faith in X's abilities that I have delegated him the authority to act in this matter.'" (11,18)

CONCLUSION

Today's junior officer wants to do his job. He wants the opportunity to train his men to win the "First Battle." Leaders must provide the guidance and example, while managers must do their best to supply dwindling resources. Most of all, subordinates need the time to accomplish their work. Leaders can, and must, establish priorities and stick to them. Combat effectiveness must start with the basics and build the pyramid from the base to the pinnacle. No officer, no matter how skilled in leadership and management, can do everything at once - and expect everything to be done well. We must strive to rid ourselves of that "stove" that has 14 "front burners." Exchange it for the standard stove. We can do this if commanders at all levels would agree to an extension of the command tour of duty from 18-months to three or more years. No one would argue that the 6-month command tour in Vietnam was a mistake. Perhaps we have not yet reached the optimum length for command time.

Ambition in itself is good, but not at the expense of the long-term goals of the Army. There is no place in the Armed Forces for "careerists." MG Lewis, who recently retired because of frustration with the "system," was upset because

...for the past decade the Army itself has been building a leadership cadre of officers who are "careerists," not professional military leaders. They are the ticket-punchers, not the fighters. Those officers worry more about their next assignment, their efficiency report, and the school and command selection lists, than in professional competence." (1,23)

The turnover of junior officers is a spinoff of the "Cause and Effect Cycle." At the center of the cycle is "Rapid Rotation." All of

the improved communications through Transactional Analysis and Organizational Effectiveness will not eliminate the cancer, although their foundation in human behavior is significant. General Rogers has supported humanistic approaches to management, but to date he has only spoken softly. The junior officer is waiting to see if he is going to use his big stick.

Junior officer retention is important; these young soldiers represent a significant commodity: HUMAN RESOURCES. Does the Office of Management and Budget account for this asset? Several corporations are beginning to capitalize their investment in recruitment, training, and development. In a discussion from Accounting for Management Control, Horngren cites the following example:

For many years, Likert has stressed that accounting systems encourage the misuse of human resources because of the undue emphasis on short-run profits. According to Likert, the attempts to maximize immediate earnings have induced managers to exert too much pressure for productivity and to have uneconomical layoffs and discharges. Why? Because increases in employee turnover and later additional spending for hiring and training more than offset the immediate savings. Likert advocates incorporating human-resource accounting as part of the formal accounting system. (8,377)

The Army cannot afford to write off 50 percent or more of its junior officers as a "tax loss." At present we are "in the red" on retained earnings in human resources. Those of us who ever reach a position in which to influence others must not "timidly remain silent." As Gentry said, "No leader can be successful for an extended period of time, and none can ever become great without a genuine awareness of people, their needs, their values, and their importance to the mission." (5,17)

Meanwhile, we can strive to be the unflawed executive as
described in this anonymous poem:

From what I've read in magazines
And seen in sundry movie scenes,
The true executive is he
Who delegates authority,
Who resolutely, firmly acts,
But only when he has the facts,
Who speaks well, writes a splendid letter,
But also listens even better,
Who cares about his men, their wives,
But doesn't meddle in their lives,
Who knows details, yet keeps his eye
On goals beyond minutiae,
Who works as long as anyone,
And leaves his desk clear, tasks all done,
Who keeps his word, although it hurts,
Who never drinks too much, or flirts,
Who even on the darkest days
Can summon up a word of praise
And bravely smile amidst disaster,
Who goes to church, and knows the pastor,
Who chairmans P.T.A. and Chest,
Who, hale and hearty, needs no rest,
But is, of course, a sportsman too,
Topnotch with golf club, gun, canoe,
The true executive, in short,
Is good at work and good at sport,
Resourceful, charming, man of talents,
Possessed of perfect poise and balance.
His words and deeds and aims all mesh...
I'd like to see one in the flesh. (2,157-8)

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